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The 2002 US National Academy of Sciences study, Technical Issues Related to the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, concluded that increased monitoring confidence
would be obtained at the 100-ton level if the auxiliary IMS network were utilized more
fully.1 If there were evidence that an event may have occurred, the auxiliary network data
would be examined to study the issue. It would be useful to know how the threshold level
of the IMS seismic network would be improved by including the auxiliary data. This
could be presented with global maps and contours by the ISS study, comparing the
primary network alone versus the primary and auxiliary, together. The NAS study
concluded that thresholds “would drop generally by about 0.25 magnitude units in
Europe, Asia, and North Africa, and by about 0.5 magnitude units in some regions
(such as Iran).”2 The NAS study also discussed four additional enhancement approaches:
(1) Augmentation with data from areas of concern, (2) correlation analysis that compares
past data from near an event with new data, (3) Threshold Monitoring that combines
signals from many IMS stations and (4) examine data from the Global Seismic Network
and the International Seismological Center with about 3,000 seismic stations. It would be
useful if the ISS study examined these conclusions.
This paper lists past estimates of the threshold detection levels for nuclear explosions for
various seismic networks, showing how seismic detection has improved over time.3 Our
pedagogical calculation shows that the average reduction in threshold level is about
0.25 magnitude units for the Total IMS network of 170 seismic stations (Primary
plus Auxiliary) as compared to the Primary network of 50 stations. It would be useful
if network simulations obtained threshold level maps for both the Total and Primary
networks for the June 2009 ISS meeting. Since the Auxiliary network can be used in both
a spotlight mode when needed or in continuous mode, it would be useful to have more
accurate calculations of this affect.
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Improved Threshold Detection
Simulation estimates of threshold detection levels of nuclear explosions have been carried
out over the decades for a variety of seismic networks. These simulations began with
cases of the United States and the Soviet Union, but now these simulations are carried
routinely carried out on a global scale. These results have improved over the decades as
seismic technology advanced for a variety of reasons:

• analog to digital seismographs
• narrow-band to broad-band seismographs
• single axis to triple axis to array seismic stations
• from magnitude picks to full seismic patterns to
correlate template patterns
• increased density of seismic stations
• from teleseismic data to using close-in regional data
• improved earth models used in regional seismology
with improved algorithms
• spectra above 6 Hz can discriminate the source term
• an understanding of geological bias factors with
preferential absorption
• improved ability to use other technologies to assist
seismology
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Past Estimates of Seismic Threshold Detection Levels
The detection levels listed below are determined for high confidence detection (90
percent detection probability) and detections are observed at three or four seismic
stations.
________________________________________________________________________
Sykes/Evernden (1982)4

15 internal (USSR), 15 external, 4 station detection
3.3–3.7 mb, 2.2–2.5 Lg

Sykes/Evernden/Cifuentes (1983)5

3 of 25 internal (USSR), 15 external, 3 mb

Evernden/Archambeau (1986)6

5 of 25 internal (USSR), 15 external
1 kt fully decoupled

Hannon (1985, 1988)7

internal to USSR, 4 station detection
10 single axis (3.6 mb)
30 single axis (3.3 mb)
30 arrays or high freq. (2.7 mb)

U.S. OTA (1988)8

30 internal USSR arrays or 50 triple-axis, 4 stations
(2.2–2.5 mb) 0.1–0.01 kt coupled, 1 kt decoupled

Claassen, Unger, Leith (1993)9

79 stations, Africa, Asia, Europe
3.6 mb(Lg) (2.6–3.9) with 4 stations (p-wave)
128 stations, Africa, Asia, Europe
3.2 mb(Lg) (2.6–3.4) with 4 stations (p-wave)
2.8 (2.2–3.2) with 4 stations (2p and 2s)

U.S. National Academy of
Sciences (2002)10

3 of 50 IMS primary stations
3.5–3 (0.03–0.1 kt), 1–2 kt decoupled
Europe, Asia, N. Africa, N. America
NZemlya, NORSAR 2–2.5 mb (0.01–0.003 kt)
120 auxiliary in near-real time lowers mb by 0.2

Provisional CTBT Technical
Secretariat (2009)11

40 of 50 stations (March 2009)
N America-Eurasia, 3 < 3.5 mb, <2.5 at NZ
not including 90 of 120 auxiliary stations
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Calculation of the Threshold Level
as a function of the Density of Seismic Stations
The technical prowess, geographic coverage and analysis techniques have vastly improved
the science of seismology and its ability to detect, discriminate and locate nuclear test
explosion. With the advent of more seismic stations, closer access to seismic sources has
reduced geometric spreading and absorption. The literature on IMS monitoring almost
universally discusses only the capability of the 50 Primary stations, without quantifying
the additional capacity available from the 120 Auxiliary stations. A higher density of
stations gives both more data and better data from the more numerous, closer stations.
The additional data is useful in ruling out background earthquakes, which increase in
number by a factor of ten as the threshold is reduced by one magnitude unit.
The Primary Network (P) will have 50 seismic stations and the Auxiliary Network will
have 120 seismic stations. The total IMS Network will use both the Primary and
Auxiliary networks (PAux) for a total of 170 stations. The ratio of the number of stations
for the two modes is significant with

(Prim. + Aux.)/Prim = PAux/P = 170/50 = 3.4.
The higher density of seismic stations per square kilometer for the Total Network gives
closer access to nearby seismic sources. We assume that the primary and auxiliary
networks are uniformly spaced. The square root of the ratio of number of seismic stations
for the PAux and P networks gives the ratio of access distances:

rPA/rP = 1/(3.4)1/2 = 1/1.84 = 0.54 = 0.5.
Thus, PAux stations might be 750 km from an event, while P stations might be 1500 km
from that event. Greater proximity reduces geometric spreading, increasing seismic
amplitudes at nearby seismic stations since conservation of energy favors proximity. In
addition, greater proximity is helpful to reduce seismic attenuation, particularly at higher
frequencies that are useful to discriminate between explosions and earthquakes. But we
ignore that issue here.
We start with a cautious assumption that understates the total impact of the auxiliary
network. Taylor and Hartse used an Lg amplitude that falls as the inverse of the square
root of the distance (1/r0.5) from the source.12 We use energy conservation below to
show that waves in idealized horizontal waveguides behave in this manner. This ignores
the faster fall-off of the more important Pg wave amplitude that fall as the inverse of
the distance (1/r). We also ignore the frequency dependent attenuation factor, Q(f),
which reduces the amplitude of the very relevant higher frequency waves.
We assume uniform geological strata in all directions, but gravity increases density with
depth, creating a waveguide of thickness H. This gives a constant seismic power flux
(pseismic in W/m2) for all azimuthal angles at a particular distance. Seismic power flux
4

varies with depth in the wave guide, but we treat this as constant. The total seismic power
Pseismic is spread over a cylindrical area of depth H and circumference 2!r, giving an
average seismic power flux of

pseismic = Pseismic/H2! r.
We assume the maximum seismic power is proportional to the yield of the explosion Y,
giving seismic power flux proportional to yield over distance.

pseismic " Y/r.
The maximum wave amplitude squared (or maximum oscillation velocity squared) is
approximately proportional to the yield of the explosion divided by the distance of the
event. Both PAux and P stations are sensitive to the same maximum amplitude (or
velocity). The more distant P seismograph is sensitive to a threshold amplitude (AT) from
a threshold yield YT at a distance rT

AT = c (YT/rT)1/2,
where c is a constant. If the approach distance of, say, 1500 km is reduced by one-half to
750 km, the detectable yield is also reduced by a factor of 0.5 to maintain the same
threshold amplitude at the seismograph.
The seismic magnitude is typically

m = a log(Y) + b,
where a is the slope, Y is in kton and b is the bias factor that depends on regional-scale
geology. The reduction in threshold magnitudes from the P network to the PAux network
is

#mT = mTP - mTPAux = [a log(YTP) + b] - [a log(YTPAux) + b]
= a log(YTP/YTPAux) = a log(2) = (0.8) (0.30) = 0.25.
The reduction of a factor of two in transition explosion yield and a reduction of by 0.25
magnitude units are consistent with the results from the National Academy of Sciences.
The NAS study concluded that thresholds “would drop generally by about 0.25
magnitude units in Europe, Asia, and North Africa, and by about 0.5 magnitude
units in some regions (such as Iran)." A magnitude reduction of 0.25 corresponds to a
yield reduction by a factor of two.
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This result understates the case in that we did not use the larger inverse distance fall-off
(1/r) of Pg wave amplitude used by Taylor and Hartse. The pedagogical result for Pg
waves would be #mT = 0.5. Our above result also does not take into account the
frequency dependent attenuation, which rises from Q of 400 at 1 Hz, to 840 at 6 Hz to
1100 at 10 Hz for Pg waves. It rises faster with frequency for L waves from a Q of 400 at
1 Hz, to 1300 at 6 Hz, to 1800 at 10 Hz. Thus, the effect should be larger than we have
estimated and the data is already paid and available, with modest additional computing
needed. But there are factors that reduce this conclusion, such as increased
background noise and more complex discrimination at lower magnitudes. Perhaps,
these effects cancel and the net improvement of #mT = 0.25 with the auxiliary
network is about correct. Clearly this a pedagogical calculation, that would be greatly
aided by network simulation calculations that take into account specific locations of the
stations, the geological media, the background noise, the response functions of the
seismographs and the source function for nuclear explosions.
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